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This is a short overview of the agent-oriented programming (AOP) framework.
AOP can be viewed as an specialization of object-oriented programming. The
state of an agent consists of components called beliefs, choices, capabilities, com-
mitments, and possibly others; for this reason the state of an agent is called
its mental state. The mental state of agents is captured formally in an exten-
sion of standard epistemic logics: beside temporalizing the knowledge and be-
lief operators, AOP introduces operators for commitment, choice and capability.
Agents are controlled by agent programs, which include primitives for communi-
cating with other agents. In the spirit of speech-act theory, each communication
primitives is of a certain type: informing, requesting, offering, and so on. This
document describes these features in a little more detail, and summarizes recent
results and ongoing AOP-related work.
1 Introduction
Agent Oriented Programming is a proposed new programming paradigm, based on a societal
view of computation. Although new, the proposal benefits from extensive previous research.
Indeed, the discussion here touches on issues that are the subject of much current research
in AI, issues which include the notion of agenthood and the relation between a machine and
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its environment. Many of the ideas here intersect and interact with the ideas of others. In
this overview, however, I will not place this work in the context of other work. That, as
well as more details on AOP, appear in a Technical Report STAN-CS-1335-90 (revised), and
subsequent publications which are mentioned below.
1.1 What is an agent?
The term 'agent' is used frequently these days. This is true in AI, but also outside it, for
example in connection with data bases and manufacturing automation. Although increas-
ingly popular, the term has been used in such diverse ways that it has become meaningless
without reference to a particular notion of agenthood. Some notions are primarily intuitive,
others quite formal. In several longer publications I outline several senses of agenthood that
I have discerned in the AI literature. Given the limited space, here I will directly present
"my" sense of agenthood.
I will use the term '(artificial) agents' to denote entities possessing formal versions of
mental state, and in particular formal versions of beliefs, capabilities, choices, commitments,
and possibly a few other mentalistic-sounding qualities. What will make any hardware or
software component an agent is precisely the fact that one has chosen to analyze and control
it in these mental terms.
The question of what an agent is now replaced by the question of what can be described
in terms of knowledge, belief, commitment, et cetera. The answer is that anything can be
so described, although it is not always advantageous to do so. D. Dennett proposes the "in-
tentional stance," from which systems are ascribed mental qualities such as intentions and
free will. The issue, according to Dennett, is not whether a system really is intentional, but
whether we can coherently view it as such. Similar sentiments are expressed by J. McCarthy
in his 'Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines' paper, who also distinguishes between the
'legitimacy' of ascribing mental qualities to machines and its 'usefulness.' In other publi-
cations I illustrate the point through the light-switch example. It is perfectly coherent to
treat a light switch as a (very cooperative) agent with the capability of transmitting current
at will, who invariably transmits current when it believes that we want it transmitted and
not otherwise; flicking the switch is simply our way of communicating our desires. However,
while this is a coherent view, it does not buy us anything, since we essentially understand
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the mechanism sufficiently to have a simpler, mechanistic description of its behavior. In con-
trast, we do not have equally good knowledge of the operation of complex systems such as
robots, people, and, arguably, operating systems. In these cases it is often most convenient
to employ mental terminology; the application of the concept of 'knowledge' to distributed
computation, discussed below, is an example of this convenience.
1.2 Agent- versus Object-Oriented Programming
Adopting the sense of agenthood just described, I have proposed a computational frame-
work called agent-oriented programming (AOP). The name is not accidental, since from
the engineering point of view AOP can be viewed as a specialization of the object-oriented
programming (0OP) paradigm. I mean the latter in the spirit of Hewitt's original Actors
formalism, rather than in some of the senses in which it used today. Intuitively, whereas
OOP proposes viewing a computational system as made up of modules that are able to com-
municate with one another and that have individual ways of handling incoming messages,
AOP specializes the framework by fixing the state (now called mental state) of the modules
(now called agents) to consist of precisely-defined components called beliefs (including be-
liefs about the world, about themselves, and about one another), capabilities, choices, and
possibly other similar notions. A computation consists of these agents informing, requesting,
offering, accepting, rejecting, competing, and assisting one another. This idea is borrowed
directly from the speech act literature. Speech-act theory categorizes speech, distinguish-
ing between informing, requesting, offering and so on; each such type of communicative act
involves different presuppositions and has different effects. Speech-act theory has been ap-
plied in AI, in natural language research as well as in plan recognition. To my knowledge,
AOP and McCarthy's Elephant2000 language are the first attempts to base a programming
language in part on speech acts. Figure 1 summarizes the relation between AOP and OOP. 1
1There is one more dimension to the comparison, which I omitted from the table, and it regards in-
heritance. Inheritance among objects is today one of the main features of OOP, constituting an attractive
abstraction mechanism. I have not discussed it since it is not essential to the idea of OOP, and even less so
to the idea Of AOP. Nevertheless a parallel can be drawn here too.
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Framework:
Basic unit:
Parameters defining
state of basic unit: .
OOP AOP
object agent
unconstrained beliefs, commitments,
capabilities, choices, ...
Process of message passing and message passing and
computation: response methods response methods
Types of unconstrained inform, request, offer,
message: promise, decline, ...
Constraints on methods: none honesty, consistency, ...
Figure 1: OOP versus AOP
1.3 On the use of pseudo-mental terminology
The previous discussion referred to mentalistic notions such as belief and commitment. In
order to understand the sense in which I intend these, it is instructive to consider the
use of logics of knowledge and belief in AI and distributed computation. These logics,
which were imported directly from analytic philosophy first to AI and then to other areas of
computer science, describe the behavior of machines in terms of notions such as knowledge
and belief. In computer science these mentalistic-sounding notions are actually given precise
computational meanings, and are used not only to prove properties of distributed systems,
but to program them as well. A typical rule in such a 'knowledge based' systems is "if
processor A does not know that processor B has received its message, then processor A will
not send the next message." AOP augments these logics with formal notions of choices,
capabilities, commitments, and possibly others. A typical rule in the resulting systems will
be "if agent A believes that agent B has chosen to do something harmful to agent A, then
A will request that B change its choice." In addition, temporal information is included to
anchor belief, choices and so on in particular points in time.
Here again we may benefit from some ideas in philosophy and linguistics. As in the case
of knowledge, there exists work in exact philosophy on logics for choice and ability. Although
they have not yet had an effect in AI comparable to that of logics of knowledge and belief,
they may in the future.
Intentional terms such as knowledge and belief are used in a curious sense in the formal
AI community. On the one hand, the definitions come nowhere close to capturing the full
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linguistic meanings.On the other hand, the intuitions about these formal notions do indeed
derive from the everyday, common sense meaning of the words. What is curious is that,
despite the disparity, the everyday intuition has proven a good guide to employing the
formal notions in some circumscribed applications. AOP aims to strike a similar balance
between computational utility and common sense.
2 Overview of the AOP framework
A complete AOP system will include three primary components:
• A restricted formal language with clear syntax and semantics for describing mental
state. The mental state will be defined uniquely by several modalities, such as belief
and commitment.
• An interpreted programming language in which to program agents, with primitive
commands such as REQUEST and INFORM. The semantics of the programming language
will depend in part on the semantics of mental state.
• An 'agentifier,' converting neutral devices into programmable agents.
In the remainder of this document I will start with an short discussion of mental state. I
will then present a general family of agent interpreters, a simple representative of which
has already been implemented. I will end with a summary of recent research results and
outstanding questions related to AOP.
3 On the mental state of agents
The first step in the enterprise is to define agents, that is, to define the various components
of mental state and the interactions between them. There is not a unique 'correct' definition,
and different applications can be expected to call for specific mental properties. 2
2In this respect our motivation here deviates from that of philosophers. However, I believe there exist
sufficient similarities to make the connection between AI and philosophy mutually beneficial.
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In related past research by others in AI three modalities were explored: belief, desire and
intention (giving rise to the pun on BDI agent architectures). Other similar notions, such as
goals and plans, were also pressed into service. These are dearly important notions; they are
also complex ones, however, and not necessary the most primitive ones. Cohen and Levesque,
for example, propose to reduce the notion of intention to those of goal and persistence. We
too start with quite basic building blocks, in fact much more basic that those mentioned
so far. We currently incorporate two modalities in the mental state of agents: belief and
obligation (or commitment). We also define decision (or choice) as an obligation to oneself.
Finally, we include a third cateogry which is not a mental construct per se, capability. There
is much to say on the formal definitions of these concepts; some of results described in the
final section address this issue.
By restricting the components of mental state to these modalities I have in some informal
sense excluded representation of motivation. Indeed, we do not assume that agents are
'rational' beyond assuming that their beliefs, obligations and capabilities are internally and
mutually consistent. This stands in contrast to the other work mentioned above, which
makes further assumptions about agents acting in their own best interests, and so on. Such
stronger notions of rationality are obviously important, and I am convinced that in the
future we will wish to add them. However, neither the concept of agenthood nor the utility
of agent-oriented programming depend on them.
4 A generic agent interpreter
In the previous section I discussed the first component of the AOP framework, namely the
definition of agents. I now turn to the central topic of this paper, the programming of agents,
and will outline a generic agent interpreter.
The behavior of agents is governed by programs; each agent is controlled by his own,
private program. Agent programs themselves are not logical entities, but their control and
data structures refer to the mental state of the agent using the logical language, a
3However, an early design of agent programs by J. Akahani was entirely in the style of logic programming;
in that framework program statements themselves were indeed logical sentences.
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Figure 2: A flow diagram of a generic agent interpreter
The basic loop
The behavior of agents is, in principle, quite simple. Each agent iterates the following
two steps at regular intervals:
1. Read the current messages, and update your mental state (including your beliefs and
commitments);
2. Execute the commitments for the current time, possibly resulting in further belief
change. Actions to which agents are committed include communicative ones such as
informing and requesting.
The process is illustrated in Figure 2; dashed arrows represent flow of data, solid arrows
temporal sequencing.
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5 Summary of results and ongoing research
A more detailed discussion of AOP appears in [7]; the implemented interpreter is docu-
mented in [13]. Ongoing collaboration with the Hewlett Packard corporation is aimed at
incorporating features of AOP in the New Wave TM architecture.
Preliminary ideas on the logic of mental state appear in [12]; a concrete proposal is
made in [11]. This latter work addresses the properties of mental state at a given moment.
Other publications address dynamic aspects of mental state. A logic for perfect memory and
justifed learning is discussed in [5]. [1] addresses the logic of belief revision; specifically, the
postulates of belief update are shown to be derivable from a formal theory of action. The
theory used there is the 'provably correct' theory presented in [3], which was later generalized
to a frameowrk admitting concurrent action [4].
In parallel to the logical aspects of action and mental state, we have investigated algo-
rithmic questions. We have proposed a specific mechanism for tracking how beliefs change
over time, called temporal belief maps [2].
We are particularly interested in how multiple agents can function usefully in the pres-
ence of other agents. In [6] we propose the mechanism of protograms to balance conflicting
influences of different agents. We are also interested in minimizing such conflicts in the
first place, and have been investigating the computational utility of social law. In [10] we
study the special case of traffic laws in a restricted robot environment; in [8] we propose a
general framework for representing social laws within a theory of action, and investigate the
computational complexity of automatically synthesizing useful social laws.
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